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OCCASIONALISM IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
DOUGLAS KUTACH AND ÖZGÜR KOCA
Abstract. This essay was completed in January 2016 and ac-
cepted for publication in a collection on occasionalism by Nazif
Muhtaroglu. It attempts to update the doctrine of occasionalism
to make it independent of theism and fit better with contemporary
physics and a modern understanding of causation. We find that
modern physics provides an avenue to support the essential core of
occasionalism.
1. Introduction
The aim of this essay is to draw on the resources present in contem-
porary theories of causation to cast light on the venerable occasionalist
tradition. The benefit of bringing centuries of thought to bear on a
historically prominent doctrine should be clear enough but so too the
danger of depicting occasionalism in a misleading manner by imposing
foreign concepts. To mitigate this danger, we are deliberately setting
aside the goal of presenting occasionalism as it would have been under-
stood centuries ago. Instead, we will explore how occasionalist theses
and arguments can be criticized or supported from a contemporary
perspective.
The defining tenet of occasionalism is that the only efficient cause
of anything is God, so that any causal role played by finite beings
must not amount to bringing about effects. (Another tenet is that
God is the efficient cause of every natural occurrence, but this doctrine
is not specific to occasionalism.) Paradigmatic examples of efficient
causation among worldly events are labeled ‘occasional causes’ by the
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occasionalist, and occasionalism holds that occasional causes are not
genuine causes.
There are two main questions we will investigate. First, it is unclear
when it is appropriate to identify some occurrence as an occasional
cause. So we can ask, what specifically distinguishes an occasional
cause from other worldly happenings? Because modern science and
philosophy often draws distinctions among different sorts of causes, we
should investigate how ‘occasionalist cause’ maps onto modern termi-
nology. In doing so, we will discover a kinship between occasionalism
and Humeanism.
Second, can we use contemporary distinctions to clarify and per-
haps bolster the case for occasionalism? The historical context of occa-
sionalism is theistic, and arguments about the nature of causation are
unlikely to attract attention nowadays if based on theological assump-
tions, which are too controversial. If a reasonable case could be made
for occasionalism that is neutral concerning theology, it might be seen
as a live metaphysical doctrine deserving more thorough examination.
For that reason, we will sketch how the essential character of occasion-
alism could be elucidated from a contemporary secular perspective.
2. Preliminary Clarifications
Contemporary terminology concerning causation is varied and in-
sufficiently precise for our purposes, so a few clarifications need to be
made.
First, occasionalism is a metaphysical thesis and as such it primarily
concerns fundamental reality, not reality. Occasionalism, we think, is
best understood as the claim (1) that there are some fundamental causal
relations of a necessitating sort and (2) that in all cases an act of God
(such as God stating that some particular effect shall occur) serves
as the ‘causing’ relatum in this two-place relation. Events in nature,
i.e., spatio-temporally located events, serve only as the ‘being effected’
relatum in this relation and never as the ‘causing’ relatum.
We say ‘of a necessitating sort’ because paradigmatic causal claims
do not presuppose that causes be necessitating in any sense. For one
thing, people commonly accept that causes might (for all we know)
have a chancy relation to their effects. For another, in contemporary
OCCASIONALISM IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 3
lingo, to say an event e has a cause c is to say that c is a partial cause of
e. According to occasionalism however, events in nature can never even
be parts of the ‘causing’ relatum in a fundamental causal-necessitating
relation.
We say ‘fundamental’ because occasionalism leaves open the possibil-
ity that events in nature can serve in some sort of causal or causation-
like relation. Occasionalists will contend that any such relations are not
genuine causes. A reasonable way to interpret this position, we think,
is to say that occasionalists deny that events in nature engage in any
sort of fundamental causing, but that they can serve as a derivative sort
of cause. In particular, natural events can appear (to the uneducated)
to bring about effects and the events involved in such appearances do
exist. The apparent cause, however, does not bring about the effect
nor does it generate the effect, nor is it a genuine efficient cause of the
effect. That is, it is not fundamentally a cause of the effect. When an
occasionalist’s opponents point to seemingly paradigmatic examples of
causation among events in nature, the occasionalist need not deny that
there is a relation between such events worth distinguishing. Indeed,
the term ‘occasional causation’ refers to this relation, and ‘occasional
cause’ refers to the natural event on the ‘causing’ end of this relation.
The occasionalist will instead characterize this occasional cause as not
genuine.
By imposing our contemporary terminology, we can reformulate the
occasionalist doctrine as follows. Because it is useful to refer to the
seemingly causal relations in nature, we can and should say that cau-
sation exists and that asserting the existence of causation leaves open
whether any causation-like relations are fundamental. At this stage,
nothing contentious about causation has been claimed, and the con-
ceptual framework is not biased for or against the occasionalist. The
occasionalist, though, goes further to make a controversial two-part
metaphysical claim: (1) There are some fundamental causation-like
relations, especially a causal-necessitating relation going from acts of
God to natural events. (2) Natural events do not bear any fundamental
causation-like relations to anything. As a result, occasional causation is
by definition a derivative metaphysical relation. (A derivative relation
is, by definition, a relation that exists and is not fundamental.)
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Second, occasionalism denies the existence of efficient causation ex-
cept where God is serving as the cause. In contemporary terminology,
‘causation’ does generally refer to efficient causation and not to the
material, formal, or final causation discussed famously by Aristotle.
However, the word ‘causation’, to modern ears, does not necessarily in-
dicate a fundamental metaphysical relation. Most contemporary theo-
ries of causation do not posit a fundamental metaphysical relation that
corresponds closely enough to causation for the theory to count as an
opponent of occasionalism. One exception we will discuss shortly is the
determination account of causation.
Third, contemporary discussions of causation routinely assume that
both cause and effect are situated in space and time and thus have a
spato-temporal connection between them. For this reason, philosophers
have been keen to use events as the causal relata. For our purposes here,
it will prove convenient to restrict our discussion to causation between
events because we can understand events broadly enough to encom-
pass other kinds of relata that have been put forth as alternatives to
events, such as processes, aspects, and tropes. Also, the contemporary
presupposition that causation involves events with spatio-temporally
connections is incompatible with God being the cause of natural events
because there is no path in space-time from God to any ordinary mate-
rial happenings. In order for contemporary theories of causation to be
applicable to divine causation, one needs to generalize them so as to al-
low for direct God to nature causation. Without trying to defend a full
account of how best to accomplish that, let us assume that God’s acts
of speaking or willing can serve as a cause and that part of any such
causation involves a direct specification of the spatio-temporal region
where the effect occurs. (This technicality will play a role in a defense
of occasionism below.)
3. What is an Occasionalist Cause?
Occasionalism was first developed by the Ash‘arites, a philosophi-
cal and theological movement in the tenth and eleventh centuries ini-
tiated by Abȗ al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arȋ of Basrah. The main goal of the
Ash‘arite doctrine of causality is to explain the consistency of natural
processes without entailing any necessitarian conclusions, either in the
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world or in God. The idea of necessity in the natural order, for the
Ash‘arites, implies a limitation of the Divine Sovereignty and Freedom.
The accentuation of God’s absolute control over the created order is
the grounding theological and pietistic motivation, as expressed by Abȗ
al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arȋ (d. 936): “It suffices for God to say ‘be’ to create
anything. Good or evil, everything is God’s creation…. None but God
creates. The deeds of the creatures are decreed and created by God.
The Qur’ān says: “God created you and your deeds.” (17:96) “The
creatures cannot create and are created themselves.” (1967, 9–10) In
a very similar fashion Yusuf al-Juwaynȋ (d. 1085), another important
Ash‘arite theologian, writes: “The one who creates everything ex nihilo
and continuously is the Lord of the Worlds. He is the creator, there is
no other creator. Everything which has a beginning is in the domain of
the Divine Power (qudra). The servant is able to do anything because
of God’s power. God is the creator and the source of His servant’s
deeds.” (al-Juwaynȋ, 1966, 1996)
The most succinct and clear expression of the theory comes from
famous al-Ghazȃlȋ (d. 1111). In the seventeenth discussion of the In-
consistencies of the Philosophers (Tehȃful al-Falasifa) he writes that
“the connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and
what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary according
to us.” The connection between cause and effect, he argues, “is due to
God’s decree, Who creates them side by side, not to its being necessary
in itself, incapable of separation.” (1997, 166) Along the same lines in
his other important work, the Balance (Iqtisȃd), he writes “no created
thing comes about through another (created thing). Rather, all come
about through (divine) power.” (1994, 314-315)
It is clear that al-Ghazȃlȋ, alongside with other Ash‘arites, rejects
necessary connection between cause and effect. Observation shows only
concomitance, not any necessary connection between cause and effect.
Constant conjunction is one thing, necessary connection is something
else altogether. God creates both cause and effect and attaches them
to each other.
Two questions arise here. First, if there are no necessary connections
in seemingly paradigmatic causal relationships, where do the consis-
tency and regularity of natural processes come from? Aristotle’s answer
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was that things have natures due to the material form that dictates their
development and behavior. Entities consistently act in certain manners
because of their forms or of innate natures (tab’). Al-Ash’arȋ rejects this
Aristotelian solution due to its necessitarian implications. Instead, he
introduces the notion of habit (‘ȃdah). God creates, not randomly, but
on freely chosen, self-imposed habitual paths (ajra al-‘ȃdah). The natu-
ral processes are consistent, not because of the entities’ innate natures,
but because of God’s habitual creation in the world. The idea of ha-
bituality precludes the depiction of God as an arbitrary king, although
the detachment of cause and effect seems to lead to the conclusion that
God creates the next moment of the universe without incorporating
causal contributions of entities.
But, is not this limiting God’s freedom? No. First these are self-
imposed habits, thus freely chosen. Second, God is not bound even by
these self-imposed habits. In rare cases, the habits of God could change.
As al-Ash‘arȋ puts it, “God follows a habit in the temporal order in
which He brings these events about, and doing it the other way would
be a violation of His habit.” (Ibn Fȗrak 1987, 134.5–8; Griffel, 2009,
127) The prophetic miracles are these exceptional violations of God’s
otherwise habitual creation to a king’s unusual gestures. To use an
analogy, “a king’s habit is to ride a horse through the marketplace; but
it is not impossible that he walks through.” (ibn Maymȗn 1975, 211)
Habituality does not limit God. In rare cases, exceptions and miracles
occur.
The second question can be formulated as the following: How does
it make sense to talk about causal relationships in the Ash‘arite oc-
casionalist context given that the theory detaches cause from effect?
In other words, what is the exact role of “what is habitually believed
to be a cause” in seemingly causal relationships? After all, despite
the rejection of any necessary connection between cause and effect, the
Ash‘arites posit some sort of causal relationship. There is some regular-
ity in natural processes, and what is habitually believed to be a cause
is consistently followed by what is habitually believed to be an effect.
Occasionalism retains the tenet that (what are habitually believed to
be) causes and effects occur in a state of spatio-temporally proximity.
What, then is the nature of this relationship between a natural event
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that is followed by another natural event in causation-like manner?
This second question can be answered by differentiating non-causation
and occasional causation.
There are at least two thinkers in the Asha’rite occasionalist context
who take up this task: al-Ghazȃlȋ and Said Nursi. Al-Ghazȃlȋ writes
that one can say an effect exists with cause, but one cannot say an effect
exists by cause. (1997, 168) The distinction between “with” and “by”
is, we believe, crucially important. Despite the rejection of necessary
relationship, al-Ghazȃlȋ seems to suggest that there is still a kind of
relationship between cause and effect, for cause and effect occur near
each other. There is a spatio-temporal proximity or contiguity. Al-
Ghazȃlȋ’s formulation of occasional causation does not require that this
relationship is necessary, but it nevertheless exists.
Said Nursi calls this spatio-temporal proximity without necessity
‘iqtiran’. Iqtiran connotes nearness, togetherness, and constant con-
junction. Nursi holds on to the basic tenets of the Ash‘arite occasion-
alism. For him, “constant conjunction (iqtiran) is one thing, necessary
connection (illiya) is another” and “the All-Glorious Maker, Who is
powerful over all things, has created causes, and so too does He cre-
ate the effects. Through His wisdom, He ties the effect to the cause.”
(2000, 180) Causal relations in the world are orderly and consistent.
The regularity of cause and effect relationships might be deceiving in
that when “the two things come together or be together” we suppose
that “the two things cause one another.” Day is continually followed by
night, but day does not cause the existence of night. Since in causal
relationships we frequently observe that the non-existence of one thing
is the cause of the non-existence of the other, we often wrongly suppose
that the existence of one thing is also the cause of the existence of the
other. (2000, 182)
For illustration, consider that certain sorts of electrical discharges
in the sky cause both a bright flash of light in the sky as well as a
characteristic sound, thunder. It is currently uncontroversial that the
flash of light does not cause thunder but that they have a common
cause, the electrical discharge known as lightning. However, because
the flash and the thunder continually occur near each other in the same
temporal order, an untutored observer could reasonably postulate a
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necessary causal relation from characteristic light flashes to thunder.
Occasionalists like al-Ghazȃlȋ or Nursi can offer the same diagnosis
of how people are generally incorrect in attributing causation among
natural events. The real cause (God) creates a pair of effects side by
side (iqtiran). Fundamentally, there is only God-to-nature causality,
but this occurs in way that permits recurring patterns among natural
events. What’s more, it is reasonable for the untutored to postulate
causation from natural event to natural event.
With cursory answers to these two questions now in hand, al-Ghazȃlȋ’s
distinction between “creation of effect with cause” and “creation of ef-
fect by cause,” and Nursi’s concept of iqtiran have proven to be helpful
for understanding Ash‘arite occasionalism. Both philosophers have as-
serted that some relationship exists between cause and effect while at
the same time rejecting the necessity of this relationship. They are
attributing to the world neither a complete lack of causation nor a fun-
damental necessitating causation, but of occasional causation, which is
some sort of derivative causation.
We have two concerns with the occasionalist’s proposed solution.
First, occasionalists have not yet developed any notion of occasional
causation with enough detail to be able to answer definitively which
events are related by the occasional-causation relation. Second, occa-
sionalists have not yet clarified what purpose the notion of occasional
causation is intended to serve.
4. Determination Accounts
Occasionalism holds that (the fundamental sort of) causation should
be understood as some sort of necessitation. This idea has reappeared
in a weaker form relatively recently in the determination account of
causation given by John Mackie (1973).
Perhaps the simplest way to set up the traditional determination
account is to define ‘determination’ as
c determines e iff c together with any laws of nature suf-
fices for e to occur.
and to add that
c is a determinant of e iff c determines e.
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Determination relations can be thought of as fundamental full-cause re-
lations. Because determination isn’t necessarily temporally asymmetric
and because contemporary science makes it extremely plausible that
typical determinants of human-scale events extend over a vast spatial
region, people may balk at calling determinants ‘causes’, but this is an
irrelevant terminological quibble. The important observation is that a
determinant serves as a fundamental structure that directly vindicates
talk of bringing about effects and indirectly vindicates all other veridi-
cal causal talk. One can account for the utility of our more restrictive
application of the word ‘cause’ by way of a metaphysics of derivative
causation and our psychology of it, as detailed for example in (Kutach
2013).
On the one hand, the determination theory of causation appears
to be incompatible with occasionalism because determination theories
posit fundamental causation-like relations among events in space-time,1
which occasionalism denies.
On the other hand, the determination theory of causation is friendly
to occasionalism in the sense that if we shift determination relations
out of nature and into the mind of God, the determination theory can
be understood as a logical consequence of occasionalism. Here’s what
we have in mind: Take a prototypical theory with determination rela-
tions between natural events, a theory where for any event c and any
appropriate spatio-temporal region R relative to c, what occurs in R
is fixed by a mathematical function of R and c. The mathematical
function L(cR) is implied by a fundamental deterministic law, for ex-
ample, Maxwell’s equations. For such a theory, the occasionalist can
strip such determination relations out of fundamental reality, and in-
stead postulate that God wills that if God wills that c, then God also
wills that L(cR) will occur in R. Furthermore, assume everything that
occurs in nature is willed by God. In this case, whenever c occurs, it
is guaranteed that God willed that c, which (given the further will of
God) implies that e = L(cR) occurs in R. Note that all we have done
1Strictly speaking, the relation needs to be defined in some sort of arena—that
is, a fundamental container space—but it does not need to be specifically spatio-
temporal; it is contentious whether space-time is fundamental.
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here is to put the fundamental deterministic law L in the mind of God
while still leaving it up to God whether to will that L holds.
One reason why this possibility might be interesting outside the con-
text of theism is that physicists sometimes postulate theories (or at
least sketch proto-theories) of fundamental physics where space-time
and events inhabiting space-time are non-fundamental and where their
derivative existence is implied by fundamental stuff that obeys a de-
terministic law. Such a model, if accurate, would vindicate the basic
conception of fundamental causation entertained by the occasionalist;
fundamental reality would be playing the role occasionalists attribute
to God.
5. Humean Accounts of Causation
The term ‘Humeanism’, as used in contemporary philosophy, is best
thought of as the doctrine that there is no fundamental causality, mean-
ing no fundamental dynamical laws or fundamental causation or fun-
damental powers or anything like that. Whatever causes (and laws and
powers) exist are derivative, obtaining by virtue of a fundamental re-
ality that consists merely of a mosaic of inert attributes like distances
and angles and brute physical magnitudes.
In the most straightforward sense, Humeanism is opposed to occa-
sionalism because Humeanism rejects the kind of fundamental causa-
tion that occasionalists believe exists between God and nature. But Oc-
casionalists and Humeans agree that there are no fundamental causes in
nature and hence that all natural causes—what occasionalists call ‘oc-
casional causes’ and what Humeans call ‘causes’—are non-fundamental.
As a result, they both need to give some account of what makes a cause
different from a non-cause, and they both tend to appeal to patterns in
nature. Occasionalists did not establish any clear distinction between
occasional causes and non-causes, but this could be addressed by ap-
pealing to the same sorts of features that Humean theories of causation
employ.
We will sketch a few of the most popular approaches only briefly. See
Chapter [XXX] for more detail.
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5.1. Regularity Accounts. The paradigmatic Humean account of
causation is the regularity account. The regularity account of causation
is notable for having virtually no public advocates while continually be-
ing criticized as if it were wildly popular. It is discussed mainly because
its relative simplicity makes for good teaching material and serves as a
foil for philosophers to use to motivate their own theories.
According to regularity accounts, a cause-effect relation going from
token event c to token event e exists exactly when the designated event
typesC and E (of c and e respectively) satisfy the designated conditions.
Regularity accounts can vary on these designations, but the primary
constraint, which gives the account its name, is that all instances of C
are followed by instances of E. This condition could (and should) be
relaxed to allow a less-than-universal regularity between C’s occurring
and E’s occurring, but we do not have the space here to address this
technicality.
Another technicality concerns what it means for C to be “followed
by” E. Implicit in formalizations of the regularity theory, there is a
presupposition that the types C and E are intended to be considered
as a pair bound with some (possibly coarse-grained) spatio-temporal
relation between them. For example, throwing a rock up in the air (in
typical circumstances) is one cause of the same rock landing on the
ground sometime between one and ten seconds and somewhere within
a couple hundred meters. It is not necessarily a cause of other similar
rocks landing in similar conditions in other parts of the universe or at
other times. It is easiest to construe the types involved in causation in
terms of a single coarse-graining of c plus e plus the spatio-temporal
relation between them, all together as one unified type.
With this presupposition made explicit, we can examine a second
condition usually imposed by regularity accounts: that the cause and
effect must be contiguous. In Hume’s day, contiguity was understood
in the context of mechanism, where objects were alleged to be influ-
enced only through contact forces imposed by adjacent objects. (That
Newtonian gravity had no known mechanism in terms of contact forces
was usually understood as a puzzle to be resolved, not as a refutation of
mechanism.) In a contemporary context, it is unclear and surprisingly
under-explored how contiguity should be understood. Causal process
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theories, discussed in the next section, provide one answer but not the
only answer and probably not the best. One liberal way to construe
contiguity would simply be to impose no further constraint beyond that
C and E must be somehow spatio-temporally related. It is unclear why
a stronger condition is needed. Indeed, it is unclear what the goal of
the regularity theory is.
Exactly how the typing of the c+e combination is supposed to be
conducted is a critical deficiency of the regularity account that often
goes unmentioned. On the one hand, if c+e is too finely-grained, there
will likely be2 only one instance of that type and most everything will
trivially count as a cause of most everything else. On the other hand,
if c+e is too coarsely grained, we get the same result; most everything
will count as a cause of most everything else. So to be useful, the
regularity theory needs some account of how in general to ascertain
types for events.
Here is where an Occasionalist could attempt to seize the opportunity
to address this deficiency and be rewarded with an account of occasional
causation.
5.2. Causal Process Theories. Another Humean (and thus occasionalist-
friendly) approach to causation is the ‘causal process’ approach, advo-
cated most prominently by Max Kistler (1999) and Phil Dowe (2000),
with a precursor in Wesley Salmon’s (1977, 1993) work. The essen-
tial idea is to identify cause-effect relations by looking at whether two
events exhibit an appropriate physical (and Humean) connection. In
Dowe’s version, the Conserved Quantity (CQ) account, a causal process
is defined the path of a conserved quantity through space and time, and
a causal interaction as a transfer of a conserved quantity among causal
processes. The result is a necessary condition: For two events to be in
a cause-effect relation, there needs to be some path from cause to effect
through causal processes and their interactions.
2This reasoning assumes that the microscopic structure of the actual world is
rich enough for absolutely exact repetitions of events to be extremely rare. This is
a reasonable assumption given what we now know about physics.
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In one respect, this necessary condition is overly weak. Assuming
(as the causal process approach intends) that at least some actual sub-
atomic particles are causal processes and their collisions are causal in-
teractions, the vast majority of events that are within each other’s light
cone satisfy the condition. This consequence makes the causal process
theory’s concept of causation unsuitable for distinguishing causes that
generally bring about the same kind of effect. For example, for any
mundane incidence of influenza, each virus particle counts as a partial
cause but so does every pebble on the Moon.
In another respect, this necessary condition is overly strong. If in-
teractions occur only by way of fields rather than corpuscles, there are
likely no paths of conserved quantities, so that virtually no causal in-
teractions will be deemed to exist. It is unclear whether and how the
CQ account applies to the actual world given what we currently know
about physics.
Exactly what causal process theories are attempting to accomplish
is unclear. It might be hoped that they would provide the resources
to reduce all causal relations to facts about the motions of elementary
particles, but its main advocates do not advance this idea. In Kistler’s
version, in particular, laws are invoked in addition to the motions of
particles.
The relevance of causal process theories to occasionalism is that
causal process theories, setting aside Kistler’s version perhaps, are
intended to treat efficient causation as non-fundamental. The claim
would be that fundamentally there is space-time inhabited by particle
world lines and conserved quantities shifting around, a Humean mosaic;
but those resources, without any fundamental efficient causation, are
adequate for establishing all cause-effect relations. Can a contempo-
rary occasionalist build on this idea? Maybe, but it would first require
being clearer about what the theory of occasional causation is intended
to achieve.
5.3. Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Counterfactual theo-
ries of causation have mostly been understood as attempting to reduce
causation to some non-causally loaded assertions that essentially in-
volve counterfactual conditionals. They constitute one approach to
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modeling efficient causation as non-fundamental. However, broadly
speaking, counterfactual theories of causation may be understood as
trying to reduce some (but not necessarily all) non-trivial aspects of
causation to facts about how effects counterfactually depend on their
causes. This broader construal of counterfactual theories is compatible
with the existence of fundamental relations of efficient causation.
The best motivation for counterfactual theories of causation is that
causes affect, and counterfactual theories are best positioned to account
for this aspect of causation. That causes affect is not a truism. Paradig-
matically, causes affect the future. What it means for an action or event
C to affect the future is for C to make the future different from the way
the future would have been had C been otherwise. This definition of
‘affecting’ is framed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To make
it more precise, we could set up a contrast between two “what-ifs”:
• On the one hand, we consider what would have happened if C
had occurred.
• On the other hand, we consider what would have happened if
C had not happened or had happened somehow different from
the way it actually occurred.
If there is a mismatch between what these two ‘what-if’s dictate for
what happens, E, at any given time and place, we say that E’s oc-
currence counterfactually depends on C’s occurrence. Counterfactual
theories basically claim that causation exists when the right kind of
counterfactual dependence occurs.
This rough idea has been spelled out in various ways. The most
popular versions (Lewis 1973) rather preposterously assume that mea-
sures of counterfactual dependence should obey the semantics of natu-
ral language counterfactual conditionals. Most discussion of the topic
also assumes the goal is to propose principled rules that match intu-
itive judgments about what caused what in particular (though perhaps
imaginary) circumstances.
The relevance of counterfactual theories of causation for occasional-
ism is that mainstream advocacy for the counterfactual approach tends
to be motivated by rejection of the idea that events in spacetime are re-
lated by any “necessitation” or any sort of efficient causation that goes
beyond what is implied by the layout of matter in spacetime. Yet the
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biggest problem using the resources of counterfactual theories of cau-
sation in support of occasionalism is that the only theories of counter-
factual dependence that are even remotely plausible employ underlying
causation-like relations—laws of nature—which occasionalists eschew.
So the task for the occasionalist is to formulate a theory of counter-
factual dependence that makes sense of how apparent causes seem to
affect later events without incorporating any fundamental metaphysics
that involves laws of nature governing how the universe evolves. The
two choices for an occasionalist are then as follows: (1) to provide some
theory of how counterfactuals work (for example, how they depend on
God’s will) that give rise to something like a non-fundamental law that
plays a role dictating how nature develops through time. (2) to pro-
vide some theory of how counterfactuals work that bypasses seemingly
fundamental laws yet vindicates counterfactual dependencies like those
evident in our knowledge of the natural world.
5.4. Probabilistic Theories. Much the same can be said about prob-
abilistic theories of causation. One way in which probability can be
introduced into a theory of causation is to understand it as built into
the fundamental dynamical law that propagates the present state of the
universe into the future. This way would simply be a more permissive
version of the determination account of causation.
Yet, the more widely discussed way of incorporating probability into
a theory of causation is friendly to the Humean and occasionalist per-
spective. The family of theories that are standardly grouped together
under the label ‘probabilistic theories of causation’ are distinguished by
relying on a special understanding of ‘probabilistic relation’. Probabilis-
tic relations in effect come from a suitably large collection of scenarios
all of which instantiate the right kind of initial conditions, from which
are derived statistical relations among suitable event types. In special
cases, the statistics might be cleaned up to respect symmetries, for ex-
ample, setting the probability of coin flip outcomes to 1/2 even when
the frequency of heads deviates from 1/2.
Then, causation among event types is defined as the right kind of
probabilistic relation. A simplistic version would have C causing E iff
p(E|C) > p(E| C). This simplistic version is widely perceived to need
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adjustment so as not to imply that C is a cause of E when the equation
holds merely because C is an effect of E or merely because C and E
are both effects of some common cause. There are further conditions
that need to be accounted for as well. Specifying an adequate theory
of causation along these lines has met with great difficulty and has not
yet succeeded. What’s more, no one has yet sufficiently characterized
the purpose of probabilistic theories of causation.
These probabilistic theories of causation are straightforwardly com-
patible with occasionalism in the sense that the causal relations among
singular (token) events are not fundamental. A single event of type C
is a cause of an event of type E only insofar as there exist the right
kind of statistical patterns in the Humean mosaic. Though there are
many similarities between probabilistic theories of causation and reg-
ularity theories, perhaps the probabilistic theories are perceived more
positively because they at least possess a richer set of resources that
correspond with the scientific practice of identifying causal factors.
6. Conclusions
The first of the two questions that inspired our discussion was, “What
is an occasionalist cause?” This question has not yet been given a de-
tailed answer by occasionalists. Al-Ash‘arȋ held that God causes ev-
erything natural by way of a freely chosen, self-imposed habit (ajra
al-‘ȃdah). But what occurrences are linked via occasional causation?
We might say those events that follow in accordance with God’s habit,
yet without more detail, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions. Al-
Ghazȃlȋ and Nursi suggested that spatio-temporal contiguity and regu-
larity marked the presence of occasional causation, but like Hume after
them, did not clarify what is accomplished by defining occasional cau-
sation in that way. Why is it better to speak, like al-Ghazȃlȋ, of effects
with cause rather than some other way that is also consistent with the
tenet that no genuine causes occur in nature? No sufficiently detailed
answer has yet been presented.
The second question was essentially, “Does anything in the contem-
porary study of causation bolster the case for occasionalism?” Here,
we discovered an intriguing possibility. Modern physicists often tinker
with models of the universe where space-time and the matter inhabiting
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space-time are non-fundamental. If some such model were empirically
adequate—by determining how matter is arranged in space and time—
it would vindicate the occasionalist doctrine in the sense that all cau-
sation in the natural world (of matter in space-time) would be entirely
derivative, holding merely by virtue of necessitating relations coming
from outside of space-time to jointly fix how matter and space-time are
arranged.
For this reason and because occasionalism has been largely perceived
as a historical curiosity rather than a live philosophical doctrine, there
is a promising opportunity to develop occasionalism further than was
ever imagined by its first proponents.
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‘an Usul ad-diyȃna) trans. Walter C. Klein. American Oriental Series, Vol. 19.
New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation.
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